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Abstract
In this paper we study the relationship between fertility behavior and the
process of marriage duration. The potential endogeneity of fertility on marriage
behavior is taken into account by modeling fertility and divorce jointly. We apply
the ”timing-of-event” method (Abbring & van den Berg (2003)) to identify the
causal eﬀect of births on the divorce hazard. We show that couples who are less
prone to divorce are more prone to invest in children, and therefore one might
(mistakenly) conclude that children tend to stabilize marriages. However, when
correcting for this selectivity bias arising from the fertility decision, we conclude
that children themselves do not have a positive eﬀect on marriage duration.
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11 Introduction
Do children stabilize marriages? The higher the value of marriage, all other things
equal, the less likely it is that the marriage breaks up. In order to achieve a higher
value of the marriage, the couple can choose to invest in the relationship. The perhaps
most important investment, at least a very long-term investment, is children. Children
represent, according to Becker (1998), a marital-speciﬁc investment and this implies
that the value to the partners of having children is not fully preserved outside mar-
riage. Accordingly, the arrival of children implies that the expected gain from marriage
increases and that divorce is discouraged.
When the question is adressed empirically, raw data sets also typically suggest that
there is a positive relationsship between children and duration of marriage. Gross
divorce rates are in general lower for couples with children than for their childless coun-
terparts. However, when the association between the two processes; marital status and
birth timing is investigated more thoroughly, the results are less clear. The empiri-
cal literature on the topic could be divided into two generations. The ﬁrst generation
models pursue a reduced-form strategy and simply includes various children regressors
in models of marital dissolution. The second generation models raise the concern that
these regressors might be endogenous. The decision to invest in children is presum-
ably not independent of the quality of the current match and hence the probability
of subsequent divorce (see e.g. Becker et al. (1977), Weiss (1997) and Vuri (2001a,b)
for theoretical models that support this hypothesis). Diﬀerent empirical approaches
have been suggested to model the potential endogeneity of fertility in models of marital
dissolution and the results are mixed.
Koo & Janowitz (1983), in a simultaneous logit model, ﬁnd neither that the number
of children or the age of the youngest child aﬀects the divorce probability nor that
separations aﬀect childbearing throughout marriage. Lillard & Waite (1993) estimate
a bivariate duration model and ﬁnd that the fertility decision and the divorce risk
are negatively correlated as suggested by economic theory, i.e. couples who are more
2prone to divorce are less likely to invest in marital-speciﬁc capital, as constituted by
children. After correcting for endogeneity of children, they ﬁnd that the ﬁrst child
has a stabilizing eﬀect on marriage, whereas second and higher order children have
destabilizing eﬀects. Vuri (2001b) analyzes the association between children and divorce
inspired by the treatment-outcome literature and ﬁnds that the presence of children does
stabilize marriages, and that this is mainly due to a very positive eﬀect from the ﬁrst
child.
In the present paper, we investigate whether the presence of children stabilizes mar-
riages in Denmark. We identify the causal eﬀect of children on the divorce risk assisted
by a newly developed bivariate duration model (Abbring & van den Berg (2003)) and
a register-based data set. We ﬁnd, without correcting for the potential endogeneity
problem, that children stabilize marriages, but that this eﬀect is due to negative corre-
lation between the two processes; marriage continuation and birth timing. When this
correlation is accounted for, we ﬁnd no stabilizing eﬀe c to fc h i l d r e no nm a r r i a g e s ,b u t
actually a destabilising eﬀect of the ﬁrst and second born child. We discuss how this
result could be explained by non-economic theories of marital satisfaction in associa-
tion with childbearing. In addition, we discuss whether the results could be driven by
country speciﬁc characteristics like relatively high labour force participation of mothers
and institutional settings for the beneﬁt of households with children.
Section 2 presents the background of our analysis in terms of the theoretical under-
pinnings and the related empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data, and Section
4 outlines the empirical speciﬁcation and discusses identiﬁcation issues in more depth.
Section 5 contains the main results, and Section 6 concludes.
32 Background
2.1 Economic theory
Why should children stabilize marriages? According to Becker (1998), marriage is seen
as a voluntary arrangement between two adults with the purpose of joint consumption
and joint production. The higher the value of marriage, all other things equal, the
less likely it is that the marriage breaks up. In order to achieve a higher value of the
marriage, the couple can choose to invest in the relationship. A very important invest-
ment, at least a very long-term investment, is children. Children represent, according
to Becker, a marital-speciﬁc investment since they belong to the couple rather than
either one of the partners, which also implies that the value to both partners of having
children is not fully preserved outside marriage. Therefore, the arrival of children raise
the expected gain from marriage and discourage divorce.
Becker et al. (1977) argue and prove1 that the causality runs in both directions: the
possibility of divorce also discourages the accumulation of marital-speciﬁc capital. This
feature has recently been modelled more rigourously by Weiss (1997) and Vuri (2001a).
Weiss (1997) introduces the notion of defensive investment which simply suggests
that investment in children is hampered if prospects of divorce are high. In the model,
fertility (and child quality) requires input of time and money by parents in the ﬁrst
period, and child quality requires input of time and money by parents in the second
period. Also, the parents’ wages in the second period depend on how much they worked
in the ﬁrst period (i.e. there is positive returns to experience in the labour market). In
the second period, new information is available, which could induce the dissolution of
the marriage. In the model, fertility in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d ,w a g e si nt h es e c o n dp e r i o da n d
the probability of divorce are therefore jointly determined.
Vuri (2001a) also addresses the two processes in a two-period model. In the ﬁrst
period, the couple observes a noicy signal of the true quality of the marriage. Based on
this signal, the couple decides how many children, if any, to have. In the second period,
1In the 1976 NBER working paper version of the paper.
4the true value of the match is revealed and the couple decides to divorce or not. This
decision is guided by comparison of the utilities obtained by continuing the marriages or
by entering the single state. These utilities depend on the amount of children produced
in the ﬁrst period. Vuri (2001a) shows that couples with children are less likely to
divorce, and that couples with higher ex-ante divorce probabilities are less likely to give
birth to children.
To sum-up, the theoretical economic literature suggests that children are stabilizing
marriages, but that the decision to have children depends on the percieved match
quality.
2.2 Other theories
Theorists within other disciplines have also been concerned about the eﬀects of child-
bearing on marriage. Especially within psychology and sociology this has been given
considerable thoughts. Twenge et. al. (2003) summarize this in four theories ex-
plaining the negative correlation between parenthood and marital satisfaction found in
several studies: 1) The role conﬂict model explains how the reorganization of social
roles towards the traditional family patternw h e nc h i l d r e na r eb o r nm a yl e a dt om a r i t a l
dissatisfaction. The new roles as parents are added to other roles as e.g. professional
roles and this may cause more stress and conﬂicts within the couple. 2) The restriction
of freedom model predicts that the presence of children in the household limits the free-
dom of the parents and hence dissatisfaction may occur. One implication of the model is
that this dissatisfaction is greater when children are infants and especially for mothers,
because they often give up more freedom than fathers. 3) The sexual dissatisfaction
model explains how children’s interference with parents’ sex lives increases the marital
dissatisfaction, especially for men. This explanation may be strongest when children
are very young because infants demand more attention - also during the evening and
night. 4) The ﬁnancial cost model suggests that the fact that children are expensive
creates a ﬁnancial pressure on the couple and if the family have traditional role models,
5this pressure will be strongest for the father bearing the largest responsibility for the
economic situation of the family.
These four models all predict a negative correlation between children and marital
satisfaction and this is conﬁrmed by the meta-analysis performed in the paper. Hence,
contrary the economic theories, the prediction from this literature is that children may
destabilize marriages and encourage divorce.
2.3 Empirical literature
The empirical studies of the eﬀect of children on marital dissolution do not oﬀer a
consensus on the nature or direction of the eﬀects of children and this may appear
surprising given the unambiguous eﬀect derived from the economic theory.
Lillard & Waite (1993) survey most of the literature (prior to 1993) in the reduced-
form category, where various children characteristics are included as exogenouos vari-
ables in models of divorce. The majority (but not all) of these studies ﬁnd that number
of children and children born in the marriage stabilize the relationship, especially when
the children are in the preschool age. Older children, children born before marriage
(but to the couple) and stepchildren tend to increase divorce risk. More recent studies
have in general conﬁrmed these patterns (see e.g. Huﬀman & Duncan (1995), Anderson
(1997), Weiss & Willis (1997) and Svarer (2002)). Lately, Böheim & Ermisch (2001)
ﬁnd on British data that the divorce risk increases with number of children. This ﬁnd-
ing is reiterated in Chan & Halpin (2002), but here the authors show that the result
is driven by a cohort eﬀect. Interacting number of children with cohort reveals that
for older cohorts the divorce probability actually decreases with number of children,
whereas the opposite is true for younger cohorts.
T h em o r es t r u c t u r a l 2 oriented empirical literature was initiated by Koo & Janowitz
2We will refer to models that endogenize fertility in the divorce equations as structural models or
second generation models. The models are not structural in the sense that we are recovering the deep
structural parameters. The notation merely reﬂects that we are imposing dependency between the
6(1983). They model a simultaneous logit model of the probability of separation and
o fh a v i n gab i r t hi nab r i e fp e r i o d . T h e yﬁnd that neither number of children or age
of the youngest child aﬀects the divorce probability nor that separations aﬀect child-
bearing throughout marriage. The logit model is not very well suited for estimation
of dynamic processes as timing of birth and divorce. Lillard & Waite (1993) improve
upon this by specifying and estimating a bivariate duration model in which the two
processes of interest are allowed to be dependent. They ﬁnd, that the fertility decision
and the divorce risk are negatively correlated, i.e. couples who are more prone to di-
vorce are less likely to invest in children. After correcting for endogeneity of children,
they ﬁnd that the ﬁrst child has a stabilizing eﬀect on marriages, whereas second and
higher order children have destabilizing eﬀects. Comparing diﬀerent family composi-
tions, they show that families with 1 child, all other things equal, have the highest
probability of continuing beyond their 12th anniversary. In terms of marriage survival
probabilities, this family type is followed by families with either two or no children.
Families with 3 children have the lowest marriage survival probability among these
families. Vuri (2001b) analyzes the association between children and divorce inspired
by the treatment-outcome literature. The treatment being the arrival of a(nother) child
and the outcome being the continuation of marriages. The identifying assumption in
Vuri’s formulation is the notion of conditional independence, which implies that data
include all systematic determinants of the process of treatment assignment (the birth
of a child), so that, conditional on these observables, the remaining observed varia-
tion in the treatment assignment is uncorrelated with the determinants of the outcome
v a r i a b l e( i nt h i sc a s et h ee v e n to fd i v o r c e ) .S h eﬁnds that having children reduces the
probability of divorce. In terms of additional children, she ﬁnds that having another
child (on average) reduces the probability of marital dissolution, but that this result
seems to be driven mainly by the negative eﬀect that having children in the ﬁrst place
has on divorce while higher order children only slightly aﬀect the divorce risk.
In sum, the literature mentioned in this section suggests that (i) children are en-
birth process and the divorce process.
7dogenous to the marital dissolution and that (ii) children born to the couple tend to
stabilize marriages. In this paper, we take a closer look at the association between
children and marital status following the tradition in the structural branch of the liter-
ature. Our analysis is based on a rich register-based data set that, compared to the data
sets used in the structural part of the literature, contains both economic variables and
demographic variables. Our empirical investigation is conducted with a more ﬂexible
econometric model that does not rely on that the data set contains multiple-spells of
a given event per individual (like Lillard & Waite (1993)), exclusionary restrictions or
conditional independence (like Vuri (2001b)).
3D a t a
The data used in this study come from IDA (Integrated Database for Labour Market
Research) created by Statistics Denmark. The information comes from various ad-
ministrative registers that are merged in Statistics Denmark. The IDA sample used
here contains (among other things) information on marriage market variables for a ran-
domly drawn sub-sample of all individuals born between January 1, 1955, and January
1, 1965. The individuals are followed from 1980 to 1995. The data set enables us to
identify individual transitions between diﬀerent states in the marriage market on an
annual basis. The information about civil status is based on the individual’s situation
on December 31 each year and is derived from household information. This means that
only individuals sharing the same address are identiﬁed as cohabiting or married. If
two individuals are sharing a ﬂat, say, without being a couple, it will still count as co-
habitation in the data. The only way we can ascertain that individuals living together
actually are partners is to consider married couples only. In this study, we therefore
restrict focus to marriages3. Of course, married couples who are not living together will
3According to Statistics Denmark the fraction of cohabitants who are partners is around 80%. Of
the married couples 78% lived together as cohabitans prior to marriage and a substantial number of
these had their ﬁrst child(ren) before they married. While we only consider marriages in the following
8be registered as single, but this type of relationships is likely to be low in number. If
there is a break in a marriage, e.g. we observe a couple to be married in 1987, to live
as single individuals in 1988 and then as a married couple again in 1989, we disregard
the break and contribute the intervening spell to measurement error.
The information used in the analysis is gathered in the following way: we observe the
individuals in 1980, where we have information about various personal characteristics
and marriage market status. For each subsequent year, we observe a new stream of data
for the individuals. If the individual enters a relationship, we also observe the personal
characteristics of the partner. Since we are interested in marriages, and especially the
personal characteristics during the marriage, we disregard left-censored marriages.
Table 1 shows the distribution of marriages, and it is worth noticing that very few
i n d i v i d u a l se x p e r i e n c em o r et h a n1m a r r i a g ei nt h es a m p l ep e r i o d
Table 1: Distribution of the number of marriages.
Number of marriages Number of persons Percentage
1 6994 95.5
2 323 4.4
38 0 . 1
42 0 . 0
3.1 Fertility data
Information about fertility is obtained from a fertility database administered by Sta-
tistics Denmark. The database contains information about all births in Denmark. For
each birth, we have information about the identity of the mother. We know the sex of
the child, the date of birth and whether it was a twin birth. On top of that, we also
have information about the identity if the father. The latter information is captured
from each child birth certiﬁcate. Here the name of the father is stated. In 96% of the
births, the information is actually provided. Based on this information, we are able
to identify all children born to the couple, whether the couple is married or not. In
we will also present results (in Section 5) for a model where we include the cohabitation period in the
analysis.
9addition, we can see if either of the partners in a speciﬁcm a r r i a g eh a sc h i l d r e nf r o m
previous relationships.
The stream of information about births enables us to construct variables that very
precisely describe the individual birth history of each individual in our sample. In Table
2, the resulting distribution of children born in the observational period is presented.
It should be noted that this distribution is clearly not equal to the distribution of
completed fertility.
T a b l e2 :D i s t r i b u t i o no fc h i l d r e nb o r ni nt h em a r r i a g e s .
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3.2 Fertility and divorce
The main topic of this paper is to analyse the relationship between fertility and divorce.
In this subsection, we present some associations between fertility and divorce. Table 3
s h o w st h ed i v o r c er a t ef o rd i ﬀerent family types depending on the number of children
born in the marriage. The overall divorce rate4 in the sample is 18%. However, the
divorce rate does not seem to be independent of the number of children born within the
marriage. The divorce rate of the marriages with no children is 23% and this declines
steadily with the number of children and is as low as 4% for marriages with 3 children.
This clearly indicates that, all other things equal, marriages with a higher level of
investment in children are stable or the reverse, namely that it is only the high-quality
marriages that have (several) children.
Table 3: Divorce rate, by number of children born in marriage.
4The divorce rate is the fraction of marriages that have dissolved before 1995.




31 4 0 . 0 4
4 1 0.02
Eventhough relatively few of the individuals in the sample experience more than 1
marriage in the sample period, in 19% of the marriages at least one of the partners has
children from an earlier relationship. Becker et al. (1977) argue that stepchildren may
constitute negative capital to the marriage and hence should tend to be a destabilizing
factor of the marriage. This hypothesis is conﬁrmed in a number of studies (see e.g.
White & Booth (1985)). In our data, the divorce rate for marriages with stepchildren
is 24.6% and 15.1% for marriages with no stepchildren.
4 Empirical model
We are interested in the causal eﬀect of children on the exit rate out of marriages.
Since both the process that leads to births and the process that leads to divorce are
dynamic by nature, we follow the econometric approach described in Lillard (1993) and
Lillard & Waite (1993) and model the two processes by a bivariate duration model. In
these models, it is claimed that in order to identify the causal eﬀect, either functional
form assumptions or identifying restrictions are required. Recently, Abbring & van
den Berg (2003) prove that the causal eﬀect actually can be identiﬁed in the types of
models considered in this paper without relying on either functional form assumptions
or identifying restrictions. In addition Abbring & van den Berg (2003) show that the
causal eﬀect is identiﬁed even if the data set only contains single-spells of observations
for a given individual. This feature of the method improves the interpretation of the
empirical model, as we will discuss below. Next, we present the ﬁner details of the
econometric approach, which is labeled the timing-of-events method. In the process,
we borrow heavily from Abbring & van den Berg (2003).
114.1 Timing-of-events method
The timing-of-events method enables us to identify the causal eﬀe c to fc h i l d r e no nt h e
divorce rate under some well-deﬁned assumptions which we return to below. The esti-
mation strategy requires simultaneous modelling of the transition from marriages and
the birth hazard. Let Tm(arriage) and Tb(irth) denote the two continuous nonnegative ran-
dom variables. We assume that all individual diﬀerences in the joint distribution of the
processes can be characterized by observed explanatory variables, x, and unobserved
variables, v. The arrival of a(nother) child and the exit rate out of marriage are charac-
terized by the moments at which they occur, and we are interested in the eﬀect of the
realization of Tb on the distribution of Tm. The distributions of the random variables
are expressed in terms of their hazard rates hb(t|x,v) and hm(t|tb,x,v).5 Conditional
on x and v, we can therefore ascertain that the realization of Tb aﬀects the shape of the
hazard of Tm from tb onwards in a deterministic way. This independence assumption
implies that the causal eﬀect is captured by the eﬀect of tb on hm(t|tb,x,v) for t>t b.
This rules out that tb aﬀects hm(t|tb,x,v) for t ≤ tb, i.e. this implies that anticipation of
the birth has no eﬀect on the marriage hazard. This assumption is clearly a bit strong
in the context of births, since births normally are announced around 9 months prior to
delivery. However, as noted by Abbring & van den Berg (2003), the time span between
the moment at which the anticipation occurs and the moment of the actual delivery
is short relative to the duration of marriages which implies that the potential bias in
the eﬀect of children on the marriage hazard presumably is rather small. Furthermore,
the assumption of imperfect anticipation can be justiﬁed in the case of births since
it usually takes some time to concieve, unplanned children are born despite modern
contraceptive possibilities or couples may have fertility problems.
Given the independence and no anticipation assumptions, the causal eﬀect of chil-
5The hazard rate is deﬁned as the rate at which individuals leave the current stage:
h(t|x,v)= l i m
dt→0
P(t<T≤ t + dt|T>t , x , v )
dt
.
12dren on the hazard out of marriage is identiﬁed by a mixed proportional hazard model.
T h a ti s ,i ti sap r o d u c to faf u n c t i o no ft i m es p e n ti nt h eg i v e ne v e n t( t h eb a s e l i n e
hazard), a function of observed time-varying characteristics, xt, and a function of un-
observed characteristics, v
h(t|xt,v)=λ(t) · ϕ(xt,v), (1)
where λ(t) is the baseline hazard and ϕ(xt,v) is the scaling function speciﬁed as
exp(β
0xt + v). More speciﬁcally the system of equations is:6
hb(t|xb,t,v b)=e x p ( β
0
bxb,t + λb(t)+vb) (2)
hm(t|tb,x m,t,v m)=e x p ( β
0
mxm,t + δD(tb)+λm(t)+vm), (3)
where D(tb): =( D1(tb),D 2(tb),D 3(tb)) is a vector of time-varying indicator variables.
D1(tb) is 0 until the ﬁr s tb i r t hi nt h ec u r r e n tm a r r i a g e ,h e r e a f t e ri tt a k e st h ev a l u e1 .
D2(tb) is 0 until the second birth in the current marriage, hereafter it takes the value 1.
D3(tb) is 0 until the third birth in the current marriage, hereafter it takes the value 1.
The timing-of-events method provides identiﬁcation on single-spell data. That is,
the data set does not need to contain multiple spells of either fertility or marriage to
identify the correlation between the two processes. This is a remarkable improvement
compared to earlier models. In Lillard & Waite (1993), it is assumed that the unob-
served components, vb and vm, are speciﬁc to each individual. This implies that the
unobserved component in the divorce hazard has a given value independent of the cur-
rent partner. A woman marrying her soulmate has, based on the unobservables, the
same risk of facing a divorce if she had married an observational equivalent person,
but with a completely diﬀerent personality. The timing-of-event method enables us to
discard this harsh restriction on the unobservable components. Instead we assume that
the unobserved components, vb and vm, are speciﬁc to each couple. In terms of the
b i r t hh a z a r dt h i si m p l i e st h a tvb captures the persistent diﬀerence in the conception
hazard across a given couple’s birth intervals.
6See Abbring & van den Berg (2003) for technical details.
13Intuitively, the timing-of-events method uses variation in marriage duration and in
duration until birth (conditional on observed characteristics) to identify the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution.
4.2 Likelihood function
Since we only observe the transitions on a yearly basis, we specify a model for grouped
duration data (see e.g. Kiefer (1990)). The duration Te,e= b,m is observed to lie
in one of Ke intervals, with the ke’th interval being (tk−1,e;tk,e] and the convention
t0 =0for ke =1 ,...,15. The probability that the duration Te for an individual with
explanatory variables xe,t and unobserved characteristics ve is greater than tk,e given
that the duration is greater than tk−1,e is given by:









tk−1,e λe(t)dt. The interval-speciﬁc survivor expression (4) is henceforth
denoted αe,ke. The probability of observing a given event in interval ke, conditional on
survival until Te >t k−1,e, is consequently 1 − αe,ke. If we do not specify a functional
form for the baseline hazard within the interval, the Λk,es are just parameters to be
estimated.
Given that the observed covariates are time-invariant within intervals (i.e. years),
we can now express the interval-speciﬁc survivor probabilities as
αm,km =e x p[ −exp[β
0
mxm,km + δD(tb)+vm] · Λm,km]
and
αb,kb =e x p[ −exp[β
0
bxb,kb + vb] · Λb,kb]
Notice, that Λ =
R tk
tk−1 exp(λi(t))dt is simply estimated as the average baseline hazard
in the given interval.
14First, notice that each marriage contributes to the likelihood function as long as
the marriage is intact. The contribution to the likelihood function from the marriage
duration alone is therefore







where jm =1if the marriage is not right censored and 0 otherwise. Uncompleted du-
rations therefore only contribute with the survivor probabilities. The interval indicator
here runs monotonically from 1 up to the end of the marriage or is right censored at
km. Concerning the birth events, things are a bit diﬀerent because multiple events can
occur during a given marriage. The interval indicator now runs from 1 to kb and then
back to 1 if a birth occurs. If the marriage ends, so does the observation of births
within the marriage. In sum, the contribution for a given marriage is then (1 − αb,kb)
in intervals with births and αb,kb in intervals without births. Let the indicator variable,
jb, take the value 1 if a birth occurs in a given interval and 0 otherwise. Consequently,
the interval indicator is reset at 1 in the interval following jb =1 . The contribution to











where G(vm,v b) is the joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity components.
In the present application, we impose two restrictions on G(·):




A2: vb and vm are perfectly correlated.7
7Theoretically, it is not required that the correlation structure is assumed to be perfect. However,
15We normalize one of the support points in each of the cause-speciﬁc hazard functions
to zero, since the baseline hazard acts as a constant term. The second assumption
restricts the correlation between the unobservables in the two hazard functions to be
either -1 or 1.
5E m p i r i c a l ﬁndings
In this section, the empirical results are presented. Our main interest is the association
between children and the divorce rate. In Table 4, we present the results from two
diﬀerent models. In the ﬁrst model, we follow the reduced-form literature and estimate
the fertility and divorce equations separately, in the second model we consider the two
equations simultaneously. We only present the coeﬃcients for the child variables in
Table 4. Besides these variables, we condition on a long range of other covariates. The
choice of covariates is based on what is usually applied in the fertility model literature
(see e.g. Heckman & Walker (1990)) and the divorce model literature (see e.g. Svarer
(2004)).8 The complete set of results can be found in Appendix 1.
empirically it is much easier to identify a more restricted correlation structure. As shown in e.g.
Rosholm & Svarer (2001), this crucially depends on the amount of multiple observations per individual.
In our sample very few individuals experience more than 1 marriage, therefore we restrict the correlation
structure from the outset.
8Since the timing-of-events method does not require exclusionary restrictions on observed charac-
teristics to identify the causal eﬀect of children, we include the same covariates in the fertility and
divorce equation. This implies that the identiﬁed eﬀect of children on the divorce risk is not driven
by instrumental variables. For summary statistics of the included explanatory variables see Table 5 in
Appendix 1.
16Table 4: Effect of children on fertility and divorce9
Reduced-form model Structural model
Fertility Divorce Fertility Divorce
In marriage
First child -0.4386a -0.4078a -0.9171a 0.8688a
0.0264 0.0679 0.0320 0.1693
Second child -1.1459a -0.2172a -1.2640a 0.1623
0.0485 0.0934 0.0536 0.1090
Third or later child 0.0266 -0.8727a 0.0703 -0.7013a
0.1149 0.2750 0.1023 0.2765
Before marriage
Stepchildren -0.2759a 0.4593a -0.3288a 0.5449a
0.0348 0.0728 0.0398 0.0852
Premarital birth -0.6437a 0.0658 -0.7992a 0.3419a








b,v m = v2
m) 0.8056a
0.0828
Number of observations 7327
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in italics.
a signiﬁcant at 5%, b signiﬁcant at 10%.
Ap o s t i v ec o e ﬃcient implies a positive eﬀect on the hazard rate out of marriages.
The inclusion of birth order indicators in the fertility model (ﬁrst, second and third
births) identiﬁes the marginal eﬀe c to fag i v e nb i r t ho nt h ed u r a t i o nu n t i lt h en e x t
birth (hence, they are to be added to get the total eﬀect). Hence, the ﬁnding of a
negative eﬀect of the ﬁrst and second births in the reduced-form model indicates that
the likelihood of a second or third order birth is lower than that of the ﬁrst birth, which
9The results in this table are from a single-spell speciﬁcation. We also ran a multiple-spell speciﬁ-
cation a long the lines of Lillard & Waite (1993). The qualitative results did not change. This conﬁms
that single-spell data is suﬃcient for identiﬁcation. The results from the multiple-spell version are
available upon request.
17is perfectly consistent with the distribution of children in the sample. The coeﬃcient
of the indicators of third and higher order births is positive but insigniﬁcant, and this
result presumably is due to the low incidence of higher order births in our sample. Both
the presence of stepchildren and a premarital birth decrease the fertility hazard. In the
divorce hazard, all three child indicators have highly signiﬁcant negative marginal eﬀects
and the order of magnitude reﬂects that the birth of the second child stabilizes more
than the ﬁrst birth and that the third birth is even more stabilizing. Hence, according
to the simple speciﬁcation the prediction is quite clear: Children have a stabilizing
eﬀect on marriages. However, the potential endogeneity of the fertility decision is not
taken into account in this speciﬁcation and if the child indicators are endogenous, the
coeﬃcient estimates are likely to be biased.
The results from the structural model in which the two processes are modelled
simultaneously reveal that the speciﬁcation of the model is crucial to the conclusion of
the impact of children on divorce behavior. In the fertility equation, the two ﬁrst birth
order indicators decrease the likelihood of another child. For the third birth, however,
no signiﬁcant eﬀect is found for higher order births. These qualitative results are in line
with the results of the separate fertility model, though the eﬀects are stronger in the
j o i n tm o d e l .W h a ti sm o r er e m a r k a b l ei st h a tt h er e s u l t sf o rt h ed i v o r c eh a z a r dc h a n g e
considerably. In the structural model, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of the birth indicator for
the ﬁrst birth is positive, the eﬀect of a second birth is insigniﬁcant, hence the total
positive eﬀect remains after a second birth. The marginal eﬀect of a third birth is
signiﬁcant and very negative, resulting in a net eﬀect which is negative.
The coeﬃcient of the stepchild indicator is positive indicating that the presence
of stepchildren is bad for the marriage, which is also the case for premarital births10.
10Premarital births could - when they are children of the married couple - be endogenized by consid-
ering the complete duration of the relationsship instead of just the period when the couple is married.
As discussed in Section 3 we choose to exclude time spend cohabiting due to misclassiﬁcation in the
data. Premarital cohabitaion is however a big issue in the Danish marriage market - 78% of the mar-
riages in this analysis began as cohabitation. Likewise, a substantial number of children were born
when the couple cohabited, but before they married. We have estimated the model including the co-
18These results are in line with other studies in the literature.
In the joint speciﬁcation of the model, the correlation between the unobservables
is estimated to be negative. This means that marriages, in which the fertility is likely
to be high (in terms of unobserved characteristics to the marriage), are less likely
to divorce. Together with the results from the observed heterogeneity, this serves to
conclude that it is not the presence of children as such that tends to stabilize marriages
(which is found, when children are not endogenised). Actually, these results indicate
that children only stabilize to the extent that couples in good matches choose to have
children. When compared to the predictions from economic theory reviewed previously
in this paper, our results only partly conﬁrm the theoretical hypotheses posed. The
correlation of he unobserved heterogeneity terms conﬁrms the results of Weiss (1997)
and Vuri (2001a), namely that couples with a high probability of divorce are less likely
to give birth. However, when children are born, we do not ﬁnd clear indications of
them being a stabilizing factor, which was predicted by Becker et. al. (1977) and Vuri
(2001a). Several factors could attribute to this ﬁnding. These are discussed below.
5.1 Child beneﬁts and divorce
Recently, Bradshaw & Finch (2002) have compared ”child beneﬁt packages” in 22 coun-
tries including Denmark, the UK and the US.11”Child beneﬁt packages” consist of a
range of elements; income tax reductions, social security contributions, cash beneﬁts,
housing beneﬁts, childcare cost reductions, education cost reductions, health cost reduc-
habitation period. The results are presented in Table 8 in the appendix. The results show that again
there is a negative correlation between the unobserved components of the two processes. In addition,
the eﬀect of children on the divorce risk is in line with the results for marriages only. That is, the
divorce hazard increases with the arrival of the ﬁrst (insignﬁcant though) and second child. In sum,
the qualitative conclusion is unaﬀected by the inclusion of premarital cohabitation.
11The report is based on ﬁgures from 2001 and therefore it does not cover the period we are investi-
gating. Still, we believe it is fruitful to present their ﬁndings, since the diﬀerence between the countries
in terms of the contents of the child beneﬁt packages in 2001 is probably not the worst predictor of
the child beneﬁts package in earlier time periods.
19tions, maternity leave programs and social assistance. In some countries the diﬀerent
elements are means-tested and in others related to household composition which makes
the comparison somewhat diﬃcult. However, some interesting patterns are visible in
the comparison. We will focus on two aspects. First, we consider the economic impact
of a transition from being in a relationship to becoming a lone parent. In Bradshaw &
Finch (2002, table 9.9b, p. 149), there is a comparison of the child beneﬁtp a c k a g ef o ra
lone parent and couples with the same earnings after tax and cash beneﬁts. The ﬁgures
reveal the diﬀerence in the amount of money a lone parent with 2 children receives due
to the child beneﬁt package compared to a couple with 2 children. For a household that
have half average male earnings the lone parent in Denmark receives an additional £130
per month (PPP adjusted) than a couple with the same earnings. In contrast there is
no diﬀerence in child beneﬁt payments in the UK between the two family types, and
in the US the lone parent receives £91 per month (PPP adjusted) less than the couple.
These numbers suggest12 that, other things being equal, the economic disincentives to
become a lone parent are smaller in Denmark, which is in line with the results reported
previously concerning the eﬀect of children on divorce. Second, Bradshaw & Finch
(2002, ﬁgure 11.10, p. 180) compare the relationship between the prevalence of lone
parents and the level of the child beneﬁt package paid to lone parents. There is a slight
tendency for countries with higher proportions of lone parents to have higher child ben-
eﬁts. The relationship is, however, not very close — the coeﬃcient of correlation is 0.06.
In addition, it is of course very diﬃcult to interpret whether this relationship is due to
more care about lone parents in countries with higher incidence of lone parenthood or
whether lone parent families are generated by the generous child beneﬁts.
12A big note of caution is appropriate here. There are, of course, other economic consequences
related to the transition out of marriage like tax exemptions and the size of alimony which are not
considered here.
205.2 Labour force participation and divorce
Childcare facilities are readily available in Denmark. OECD (2001) presents data show-
ing that in 1998 91% of pre-school children in Denmark attended formal child-care
arrangements. The numbers for the UK and the US were 60% and 74%, respectively.
In accordance, the labour force participation of mothers to young children is much
higher in Denmark compared to other countries. Ejrnæs et. al. (2002) show that more
than 70% of all mothers to pre-school children are active in the labour market and that
this high participation rate has persisted since the early 1980s. In comparison, OECD
(2001) ﬁnd that in the US the participation rate for mothers of pre-school children was
61.5% in 1998 rising from 54% in 1989, and in the UK it was 55.8% in 1998 rising from
4 2 . 7 %i n1 9 8 9 .T h ef a c tt h a tD a n i s hw o m e na r em o r ea c t i v eo nt h el a b o u rm a r k e ta l s o
makes them more economic independent of the husbands. In the divorce literature, it
is commonly found that higher wages for women are correlated with higher divorce risk
(see. e.g. Weiss & Willis (1997) and Burgess et al. (1997)). Burgess et al. (1997) refer
to a self-reliance eﬀect for women to explain the result.
In sum, the institutional setup in Denmark is providing more favorable conditions
for women with young children that decide to divorce their current spouse. Whether
this is the main reason for the diﬀerence between the results in this paper and the
results found in Vuri (2001b) is of course hard to determine. Nevertheless, the diﬀerent
institutional settings provide a plausible explanation for the deviations. In addition,
the data presented above suggest that in terms of labour force participation of mothers
of pre-school children, an increasing proportion of mothers are becoming active in the
labour market. OECD (2001) provides numbers showing that rising labour force par-
ticipation rates are found in almost all OECD countries. The increasing labour force
participation of women might alter the eﬀect of children on divorce in other countries
as well.
215.3 Children and marital satisfaction
As discussed in Section 2 psychologists have suggested that children aﬀect marital
satisfaction through various channels. These all point in the same direction suggesting
that the arrival of children into the household is followed by a number of challenges
to the couple. With an eye to these studies the results found in this paper are not
too surprising. Especially the combination of a high female labour force participation,
the conﬂicts arising because of the reorganization of social roles in the family and the
resriction of freedom of mothers may lead to a higher divorce rate for Danish couples
with children than observed in other countries. Furthermore, the relatively generous
child beneﬁts schemes for lone parents combined with the economic dependent Danish
women may increase the likelihood of actually divorcing.
6 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between fertility behavior and
the process of marriage duration in order to investigate whether children born to a
couple stabilize their relationship. The analysis is based on Danish register data. The
potential endogeneity of fertility on marriage behavior is taken into account by modeling
fertility and divorce jointly. We use the ”timing-of-event” method (Abbring & van den
Berg (2003)) to identify the causal eﬀect of births on the divorce hazard.
The results presented in this paper show that couples that are less prone to divorce
are more prone to invest in children, and therefore children tend to stabilize marriages.
However, when correcting for this selection eﬀect, children in themselves do not have a
positive eﬀect on marriage duration.
In sum, the results in this article conﬁrm what papers in the more structural-oriented
literature on the eﬀect of children on divorce have found, namely, that the two processes
should not be considered independently. When they are considered independently, as
i nt h em o r er e d u c e d - f o r mp a r to ft h el i t e r a t u r e ,t h ee s t i m a t e de ﬀects are likely to be
22biased. This may explain why diﬀerent results are found in diﬀerent applications. Still,
the ﬁndings in this paper suggest, that endogenizing fertility is not suﬃcient to align
results. We present cross-country data showing that Danish mothers of pre-school
children — compared to mothers of pre-school children in other OECD countries — have
more favorable conditions in terms of child beneﬁts and labour force participation in
case they decide to divorce their present spouse. In addition, the development in e.g.
labour force participation of mothers to young children in other OECD contries in the
last decade shows that there is a marked increase in labour force participation in almost
all countries. If this development continues and reaches the level of Danish mothers, it
could also aﬀect the eﬀect of children on divorce risk in those countries.
In future research it would be fruitful to include more information about the charac-
teristics of the diﬀerent countries in terms of child-related attributes; child allowances,
day-care facilities, economic conditions for lone-parents etc. in order to shed more light
on what causes the diﬀerent results on the eﬀect of children on divorce. On the theo-
retical side it is clear that the results in this paper suggest that the theoretical models
on the eﬀect of children on divorce risk could beneﬁt from more elaboration perhaps
inspired by the psychology literature.
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Premarital birth to the couple 0.3214 0.4670
Cohabitation
Couple has cohabited 0.7831 0.4121






Husband more educated 0.2828 0.4504
Couple has same degree of eduation 0.4663 0.4989
Income (in 1980 DKK)
Wife’s income 0.7836 0.3268
Husband’s income 1.1191 0.5918
Age
Wife between 15-20 0.3966 0.4892
Wife between 21-25 0.4278 0.4943
Wife between 26-30 0.1339 0.3406
Husband between 15-20 0.2154 0.4112
Husband between 21-25 0.4608 0.4985
Husband between 26-30 0.2247 0.4174
Wife more than 4 years older 0.0315 0.1747
Husband more than 4 years older 0.2303 0.4211
Sickness and unemployment
Sickness, wife 0.1779 0.3850
Sickness, husband 0.1247 0.3314
Unemployment degree, wife 0.1268 0.2368
Unemployment degree, husband 0.0712 0.1767
Other characteristics
Work for same employer 0.0998 0.2998
Province 0.6312 0.2332
Number of divorces 1298
Number of observations 7327
27Table 6: Results from the Reduced-form model
Fertiliy hazard Divorce hazard
Coeﬀ.S t d d e v .C o e ﬀ.S t d d e v .
Children
First child this marriage -0.4492 0.0278 -0.4063 0.0686
Second child this marriage -1.1472 0.0536 -0.2153 0.0942
Third or later child this marriage 0.0632 0.1033 -0.7635 0.2773
Stepchildren -0.2548 0.0352 0.4744 0.0727
Premarital birth to the couple -0.5879 0.0332 0.0682 0.0715
Cohabitation
Couple has cohabited 0.0361 0.0298 -0.2093 0.0798
Duration of cohabitation -0.0284 0.0067 -0.1161 0.0215
Wife’s education
Vocational 0.1177 0.0305 -0.4538 0.0756
Short 0.2096 0.0437 -0.5241 0.1242
Medium 0.2818 0.0454 -0.4344 0.1303
Long 0.2549 0.0558 -0.5715 0.1680
Husband more educated 0.0897 0.0343 -0.4243 0.0977
Couple has same degree of eduation 0.0137 0.0291 -0.0641 0.0786
Income (in 1980 DKK)
Wife’s income 0.1163 0.0369 0.3482 0.0910
Husband’s income 0.0335 0.0219 0.1008 0.0516
Age
Wife between 15-20 0.8650 0.0807 0.3939 0.1710
Wife between 21-25 0.8453 0.0708 0.3150 0.1351
Wife between 26-30 0.6131 0.0671 0.0913 0.1196
Husband between 15-20 0.2390 0.0703 0.5295 0.1744
Husband between 21-25 0.2594 0.0514 0.2714 0.1232
Husband between 26-30 0.3013 0.0420 0.2002 0.0937
Wife more than 4 years older -0.2185 0.0849 0.1759 0.1701
Husband more than 4 years older -0.0063 0.0346 0.2346 0.0889
Sickness and unemployment
Sickness, wife -0.1045 0.0317 0.1132 0.0720
Sickness, husband -0.1406 0.0372 0.2221 0.0786
Unemployment degree, wife 0.1920 0.0469 0.2826 0.1109
Unemployment degree, husband -0.1009 0.0736 0.9528 0.1385
Other characteristics
Work for same employer 0.0662 0.0362 0.2327 0.0834
Province 0.1427 0.0239 -0.2530 0.0600
Number of observations 7327
Note: Bold ﬁgures indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at 5% level.
28Table 7: Results from the Structural Model
Fertiliy hazard Divorce hazard
Coeﬀ.S t d d e v .C o e ﬀ.S t d d e v .
Children
First child this marriage -0.9171 0.0320 0.8688 0.1693
Second child this marriage -1.2640 0.0536 0.1623 0.1090
Third or later child this marriage 0.0703 0.1023 -0.7013 0.2765
Stepchildren -0.3288 0.0398 0.5449 0.0805
Premarital birth to the couple -0.7992 0.0369 0.3419 0.0839
Cohabitation
Couple has cohabited 0.0478 0.0348 -0.2453 0.0852
Duration of cohabitation -0.0310 0.0077 -0.1188 0.0227
Wife’s education
Vocational 0.0566 0.0342 -0.4146 0.0798
Short 0.1406 0.0495 -0.4979 0.1304
Medium 0.2380 0.0511 -0.4628 0.1379
Long 0.2410 0.0673 -0.5488 0.1761
Husband more educated 0.0499 0.0390 -0.4478 0.1039
Couple has same degree of eduation 0.0057 0.0334 -0.0950 0.0829
Income (in 1980 DKK)
Wife’s income 0.1114 0.0436 0.3399 0.0958
Husband’s income 0.0604 0.0252 0.0746 0.0572
Age
Wife between 15-20 0.8178 0.0849 0.3297 0.1760
Wife between 21-25 0.8660 0.0729 0.2109 0.1407
Wife between 26-30 0.6640 0.0667 -0.0311 0.1234
Husband between 15-20 0.1715 0.0759 0.5820 0.1802
Husband between 21-25 0.2135 0.0559 0.3117 0.1257
Husband between 26-30 0.3070 0.0439 0.2010 0.0964
Wife more than 4 years older -0.3034 0.0885 0.2501 0.2032
Husband more than 4 years older 0.0011 0.0395 0.2296 0.0924
Sickness and unemployment
Sickness, wife -0.0108 0.0329 0.0429 0.0723
Sickness, husband -0.0791 0.0393 0.1834 0.0802
Unemployment degree, wife 0.2391 0.0489 0.2692 0.1147
Unemployment degree, husband -0.0802 0.0767 0.9330 0.1429
Other characteristics
Work for same employer 0.0977 0.0381 0.1881 0.0857







2 ) 0.8014 0.0686
Number of observations 7327
Note: Bold ﬁgures indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at 5% level.
29Table 8: Results from the Structural Model - cohabitation and marriage
Fertiliy hazard Divorce hazard
Coeﬀ.S t d d e v .C o e ﬀ.S t d d e v .
Children
First child this marriage -0,2409 0,0266 0,0580 0,0611
Second child this marriage -1,4018 0,0352 0,1692 0,0683
Third or later child this marriage -3,1911 0,4635 -0,0561 0,1377
Stepchildren -0,1751 0,0145 0,1448 0,0171
Wife’s education
Vocational -0,0959 0,0243 -0,1675 0,0328
Short -0,0754 0,0366 -0,2279 0,0516
Medium 0,0627 0,0391 -0,2951 0,0583
Long -0,1729 0,0476 -0,0563 0,0627
Husband more educated -0,0488 0,0289 -0,2053 0,0407
Couple has same degree of eduation 0,0227 0,0241 -0,1394 0,0333
Income (in 1980 DKK)
Wife’s income 0,2956 0,0281 -0,1957 0.0399
Husband’s income 0,1252 0,0138 -0,2751 0.0260
Age
Wife between 15-20 0,4791 0.0601 0.1836 0.0789
Wife between 21-25 0,8286 0.0518 -0.0022 0.0675
Wife between 26-30 0,7666 0,0484 -0,1735 0,0616
Husband between 15-20 -0,2536 0,0511 0,1740 0,0708
Husband between 21-25 0,0704 0,0390 0,1248 0,0565
Husband between 26-30 0,2049 0,0319 0,0542 0,0469
Wife more than 4 years older -0,2461 0,0539 0,4229 0,0682
Husband more than 4 years older -0,0378 0,0273 0,1891 0,0387
Sickness and unemployment
Sickness, wife 0,1329 0,0223 0,0452 0,0321
Sickness, husband 0,0039 0,0257 0,0455 0,0338
Unemployment degree, wife 0,3348 0,0329 0,2253 0,0467
Unemployment degree, husband 0,0651 0,0437 0,5461 0,0521
Other characteristics
Work for same employer 0,1139 0,0260 0,0336 0,0339







2 ) 0.3714 0.0762
Number of observations 19471
Note: Bold ﬁgures indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at 5% level.
30